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How Terrorist Grou=
ps End
Implications for
Countering al Qa'ida
|
Abstract
How do
terrorist groups end? The evidence since 1968 indicates that terrorist gr=
oups
rarely cease to exist as a result of winning or losing a military campaig=
n.
Rather, most groups end because of operations carried out by local police=
or
intelligence agencies or because they join the political process. This
suggests that the =
United States=
should pursue a counterterrorism strategy =
against
al Qa'ida that emphasizes policing and intelligence gathering rather than=
a
“war on terrorism” approach that relies heavily on military for=
ce.
|
The United States cannot conduct an effective counterterrorism
campaign against al Qa'ida or other terrorist groups without understanding =
how
such groups end. While it is clear that U.S. policymakers will need to turn to a range of
policy instruments to conduct such campaigns — including careful police
and intelligence work, military force, political negotiations, and economic
sanctions — what is less clear is how they should prioritize U.S. efforts.
A recent <=
st1:place>RAND research effort sheds light on this issue by
investigating how terrorist groups have ended in the past. By analyzing a
comprehensive roster of terrorist groups that existed worldwide between 1968
and 2006, the authors found that most groups ended because of operations
carried out by local police or intelligence agencies or because they negoti=
ated
a settlement with their governments. Military force was rarely the primary
reason a terrorist group ended, and few groups within this time frame achie=
ved
victory.
These findings su=
ggest
that the U.S. approach to countering al Qa'ida has focused=
far
too much on the use of military force. Instead, policing and intelligence
should be the backbone of U.S. efforts.
First
Systematic Examination of the End of Terrorist Groups
This was the first
systematic look at how terrorist groups end. The authors compiled and analy=
zed
a data set of all terrorist groups between 1968 and 2006, drawn from a
terrorism-incident database that RAND and the Memorial Institute for the Preventio=
n of
Terrorism jointly oversee. The authors used that data to identify the prima=
ry
reason for the end of groups and to statistically analyze how economic
conditions, regime type, size, ideology, and group goals affected their
survival. They then conducted comparative case studies of specific terrorist
groups to understand how they ended.
Of the 648 groups=
that
were active at some point between 1968 and 2006, a total of 268 ended during
that period. Another 136 groups splintered, and 244 remained active. As
depicted in the figure, the authors found that most ended for one of two
reasons: They were penetrated and eliminated by local police and intelligen=
ce agencies
(40 percent), or they reached a peaceful political accommodation with their
government (43 percent). Most terrorist groups that ended because of politi=
cs
sought narrow policy goals. The narrower the goals, the more likely the gro=
up
was to achieve them through political accommodation — and thus the more
likely the government and terrorists were to reach a negotiated settlement.=
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How 268 Terrorist Groups Worldwide Ended,
1968–2006
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![3D"How](3D"HowTerroristGroupsEndImplicationsforCounteringalQa'ida_Rand_July=)
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In 10 percent of =
cases,
terrorist groups ended because they achieved victory. Military force led to=
the
end of terrorist groups in 7 percent of cases. The authors found that
militaries tended to be most effective when used against terrorist groups
engaged in insurgencies in which the groups were large, well armed, and well
organized. But against most terrorist groups, military force was usually too
blunt an instrument.
The analysis also=
found
that
religiously motivated terror=
ist
groups took longer to eliminate than other groups but rarely achieved their
objectives; no religiously motivated group achieved victory during the peri=
od
studied.
size significantly determined a group's fate.
Groups exceeding 10,000 members were victorious more than 25 percent of the
time, while victory was rare for groups below 1,000 members.
terrorist groups from upper-income countries =
are
much more likely to be left-wing or nationalist and much less likely to be
motivated by religion.
Police-Oriented
Counterterrorism Rather Than a “War on Terr=
orism”
What does this me=
an for
counterterrorism efforts against al Qa'ida? After September 11, =
2001, U.S. strategy against al Qa'ida concentrated on t=
he use
of military force. Although the United States has employed nonmilitary instruments —
cutting off terrorist financing or providing foreign assistance, for example
— U.S. policymakers continue to refer to the strate=
gy as
a “war on terrorism.”
But military forc=
e has
not undermined al Qa'ida. As of 2008, al Qa'ida has remained a strong and
competent organization. Its goal is intact: to establish a pan-Islamic
caliphate in the Midd=
le
East by uniting Mus=
lims
to fight infidels and overthrow West-friendly regimes. It continues to empl=
oy
terrorism and has been involved in more terrorist attacks around the world =
in
the years since September 11, 2001, than in prior years, though engaging in no
successful attacks of a comparable magnitude to the attacks on New York and Washington.
Al Qa'ida's resil=
ience
should trigger a fundamental rethinking of U.S. strategy. Its goal of a pan-Islamic caliphate
leaves little room for a negotiated political settlement with governments in
the Middle East. A more effective U.S. approach would involve a two-front strategy:=
Make policing and intelligence the backbone of U.S. efforts. Al Qa'i=
da
consists of a network of individuals who need to be tracked and arrested. T=
his
requires careful involvement of the Central Intelligence Agency and Federal
Bureau of Investigation, as well as their cooperation with foreign police a=
nd
intelligence agencies.
Minimize the use of U.S. military force. =
In
most operations against al Qa'ida, local military forces frequently have mo=
re
legitimacy to operate and a better understanding of the operating environme=
nt
than U.S. forces have. This
means a light U.S. military footpri=
nt or
none at all.
Key to this strat=
egy is
replacing the war-on-terrorism orientation with the kind of counterterrorism
approach that is employed by most governments facing significant terrorist
threats today. Calling the efforts a war on terrorism raises public
expectations — both in the United States and elsewhere — that there is a battlef=
ield
solution. It also tends to legitimize the terrorists' view that they are
conducting a jihad (holy war) against the United States and elevates them to the status of holy warr=
iors.
Terrorists should be perceived as criminals, not holy warriors. =
Read
the Full Report
This research brief
describes work done for the RAND
Corporation's continuing program of self-initiated
independent research documented in How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qa'ida<=
/em>,
by Seth G. Jones and Martin C. Libicki, MG-741-RC, 2008, 252 pp., ISBN:
978-0-8330-4465-5 (<=
span
style=3D'color:#526194'>Full Document).
This product is part=
of the RAND Corporation research
brief series. RAND research briefs present policy-oriented summ=
aries
of individual published, peer-reviewed documents or of a body of published
work.
Copyright © 200=
8 RAND Corporation
The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organiza=
tion
providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the
challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world. <=
st1:place>RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the
opinions of its research clients and sponsors.
RB-9351-RC (2008)
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